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The Privileges or Immunities Clause has been a puzzle. It was 
probably more important to those who drafted the Amendment 
than the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, yet it has 
played almost no role in judicial enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Even in the hands of originalists, the Clause eludes 
consistency, being described as everything from an inkblot to a 
guaranty of our most important liberties. 3 And, despite the urging 
of several scholars, the Supreme Court has refused to pull the 
Clause down from its attic of forgotten constitutional odds and 
ends. 4 
With The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and 
Immunities (~f Citizenship, Kurt Lash hopes to solve this puzzle 
and give courts a "historically plausible and judicially manageable 
interpretation" (p. x). Lash has established himself as one of the 
foremost originalist scholars, 5 and in The Fourteenth Amendment 
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he develops a detailed and thorough originalist analysis of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The book will no doubt become one of the principal works on the 
Clause and has already garnered high praise. 6 
The Fourteenth Amendment is also provocative. Originalist 
analysis, Lash argues, shows that the Clause was understood to 
apply the Bill of Rights to the states, but otherwise leaves issues 
of rights and privileges up to state courts and legislatures. Thus 
Lash is at once expansive in arguing that the Clause fully 
incorporates the Bill of Rights and restrictive in denying a role for 
the Clause in securing unenumerated fundamental rights. In 
establishing this thesis, Lash challenges some of the key 
conclusions of leading scholars. He also proposes what some have 
argued is not possible: a coherent public-meaning originalist 
analysis of the Reconstruction Amendments. 7 The Fourteenth 
Amendment makes a solid case that the privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the United States was an antebellum legal term-of-
art conceptually distinct from other privileges and immunities of 
citizenship. Lash also presents an impressive study of John 
Bingham's views on the privileges of United States citizenship and 
their relationship to natural rights and equality. In addition, Lash 
nicely uses press and campaign materials to highlight the election 
of 1866 as a critical constitutional moment. Through each of these 
steps Lash firmly establishes that the Bill of Rights was meant (by 
drafters and the public) to be applied to the states by the 
Amendment. 
It is in the second half of his thesis- that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause was understood to do no more than apply the 
Bill of Rights to the States-that The Fourteenth Amendment 
reveals its weaknesses. The Fourteenth Amendment suffers from a 
flaw not uncommon in originalism: in order to give a fixed 
meaning to facially vague constitutional language, The Fourteenth 
Amendment imposes a false precision and clarity on a historical 
record that is ambiguous and conflicted. At each stage of his 
analysis, Lash makes important choices-of emphasis, selection, 
6. See Michael Ramsey, New Book: Kurt Lash's "The Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship", THE ORIGINALISM BLOG, (Apr. 
14, 2014, 6:24AM), htlp://originalismhlog.typcpad.com/thc-originalism-hlog/2014/04/ncw-
hook-kurt-lashs-thc-f<lUrtccnth-amcndmcnt-and-thc-privilcgcs-and-immunitics-of-amcri 
can-citizcnsh.html. 
7. Barry Friedman, The Second Founding: Reconstructing Reconstruction: Some 
Problems for Originalists (And Everyone Else, Too), 11 lJ. PA. J. CONST. L. 1201 (2009). 
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and interpretation- that are questionable and undermine his 
eventual thesis. 
More fundamentally, however, The Fourteenth Amendment 
reflects the failure of current versions of originalism to address 
the complexity of the concept of "public'' as it existed in the 
nineteenth century. In his effort to apply the theory of public-
meaning originalism, Lash presents a limiting and historically 
inaccurate concept of the "public." Lash's public, it turns out, was 
comprised of the voting population as of November 1866. This 
ignores important contemporaneous perspectives of African-
Americans and feminists-the people for whom inclusion or 
exclusion from the privileges of citizenship was most important. 
When combined with Lash's marginalization of voices within the 
Republican Party who at times articulated some of the 
perspectives of African-Americans and women, the "public" 
meaning that results is, not surprisingly, restrictive and limited. 
Lash describes a public meaning for the Clause that excludes 
any unenumerated fundamental rights and shifts equality 
concerns away from citizenship and toward the Equal Protection 
Clause. Although such a view is a plausible description of the 
views of conservatives and moderates in 1866, it cannot be 
described as the public meaning. A far more robust idea of the 
Clause, and of the Reconstruction Amendments, was articulated 
by radical white Republicans, African-Americans, and feminists. 
This view encompassed a forward-looking, natural-rights 
constitutionalism that potentially led in quite different directions 
than Lash's interpretation permits. There was no singular 
meaning for the Clause among its drafters, or the voters in the fall 
of 1866, or the ratifiers in 1867-68, and certainly not among all the 
citizens of the United States. Indeed, there was not even a singular 
"public" among these groups, given the widespread exclusions 
from politics, law, and the (mainstream) press at the time. 
Because The Fourteenth Amendment does not engage such 
complexity in the historical structure of the public and public 
meaning, it cannot capture the hermeneutic range and potential 
for the Privileges or Immunities Clause or the Amendment as a 
whole. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts. In Part One I summarize 
The Fourteenth Amendment. The book is far richer and more 
nuanced than any short summary can capture, and my hope is 
merely to set out the main points of Lash's original and thought-
provoking analysis. Part Two presents what might be described as 
an internal critique. Lash's analysis is subject to criticism from 
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within an originalist framework, particularly in his determination 
that open-textured natural or fundamental rights are not relevant 
to the meaning of the Clause. Unlike originalist critiques, 
however, I conclude not by suggesting that Lash is wholly wrong 
and some other interpretation wholly right, but by pointing out 
that multiple interpretations were available and were important 
to drafters and the legal and voting publics. Part Three sets forth 
the more fundamental critique, which is that the very conception 
of the "public" and public meaning is flawed and that such flaws 
operate to exclude important meaning communities, such as 
African-Americans and feminists. I conclude with some thoughts 
on how such perspectives can be incorporated into a richer, and 
more accurate, idea of public meaning originalism. 
I. 
Originalists have disagreed significantly about the scope of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. On the one hand some 
scholars contend that the Clause merely ensures equal treatment 
for citizens of the privileges states may provide.x Other scholars 
argue that the Clause protects and nationalizes natural or 
fundamental rights beyond those listed in the Bill of Rights. 9 And 
still others declare the Clause a "riddle" or an "inkblot" with no 
inherent content at all. 10 
Lash stakes out a middle ground in this debate. According to 
him, the Privileges or Immunities Clause had a specific and 
circumscribed meaning that included the Bill of Rights and any 
other right specifically listed in the Constitution (including 
interstate equality from the Comity Clause), but excluded 
unenumerated fundamental (or natural) rights, left intrastate 
equality concepts to the Equal Protection Clause, and retained a 
substantial portion of antebellum federalism (pp. xii, 232 n.3, 300). 
This is a relatively unusual view of the Clause, since most 
interpretations that support Bill-of-Rights incorporation also 
X. Philip Hamhurger, Privileges and Immunities, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 61 (2011) 
(interstate equality); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
101 YALE L.J. 13X5 (1992) (intrastate equality). 
9. Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165, 254-55 (2011) (natural rights to life, 
liherty, and property); Douglas G. Smith, Natural Law, Article IV, and Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 AM. lJ. L. REV. 351 (1997). 
10. BORK, supra note 3; George C. Thomas III, The Riddle of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 6X OHIO ST. L.J. 1627 (2007). 
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contend that other fundamental rights, such as rights to contract 
and to own property, were also included." 
Lash supports this interpretation by analyzing both 
antebellum legal usages and the Amendment's drafting history. 
First, analyzing antebellum referents for the Clause, Lash rejects 
the belief of "almost all current" scholars that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause was based on the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV (the Comity 
Clause) and the exposition of that Clause by Justice Washington 
in Corfield v. Coryell. 12 Instead he argues that the privileges and 
immunities of United States citizenship (as opposed to state 
citizenship or citizenship generally), operated as a legal term-of-
art rooted in United States territorial cession treaties where 
residents of the transferred territories transitioned from being 
subjects of foreign sovereigns to citizens of the United States (pp. 
47-52). This treaty language ("the enjoyment of all the rights, 
advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States") was, 
according to Lash, consistently identified with the protections of 
the Constitution and distinguished from state privileges or natural 
rights (pp. 52-59). 
Lash also challenges the conventional readings of key cases, 
particularly Corfield. Lash suggests that the vast majority of cases 
analyzing the Comity Clause adhered to a consensus view "that 
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the states differed 
from state to state," that only a subset of those privileges would 
qualify for interstate protection of visitors, and that the privileges 
were only those secured or conferred by states, not ones 
determined by natural law and subject to a more general 
recognition (pp. 20-47). In particular, Lash contends that Corfield 
followed this consensus view and did not support the idea of 
federal or national privileges based on natural rights. Other cases 
followed this reading of Corfield, and it was only with the debates 
among Republicans in the Reconstruction congress that Corfield 
came to represent a nationalized fundamental rights position (p. 
47). 
Lash's second support for his limited Bill-of-Rights reading 
is also boldly unconventional: he argues that the primary author 
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative 
John Bingham, intentionally changed his draft to invoke this 
11. E.g., BARNErr, supra note 3; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: 
A BIOGRAPHY 3X9-90 (2005). 
12. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. IX23). 
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antebellum term-of-art and to distinguish it from both state-based 
privileges and natural rights. n Lash argues that Bingham probably 
realized after the congressional debates surrounding his draft 
that, because many radical Republicans read the Comity Clause 
privileges and immunities language to include fundamental and 
civil rights, he needed language that avoided that interpretation, 
both to preserve the enumerated rights-reading and to keep 
moderate and conservative Republicans on board supporting the 
Amendment (pp. 153-54). Bingham altered his draft, choosing 
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" rather 
than the Comity Clause's "privileges and immunities of citizens in 
the several states" to better capture his more limited meaning (pp. 
72-73). 
Lash skillfully identifies a consistent viewpoint in Bingham's 
speeches. 14 His interpretation respects Bingha1m's ability (a 
respect that eluded an earlier generation of originalists) 15 and 
provides a plausible explanation of seemingly disparate themes. 
Still, up to this point The Fourteenth Amendment reads much like 
many other originalist and historically based analyses of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause: extensive analysis of antebellum 
cases and legal materials and detailed combing of congressional 
drafting debates from 1866. Lash adds depth and original analysis, 
but in his use of source materials he is on familiar ground. 
With chapter four we see that we have been reading an 
extended prelude. A careful reader would understand this, for 
early on Lash tells us that "the goal of this book is to illuminate 
the original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause" (p. xiv). He disclaims reliance on an older form of 
originalism that focused on the drafters' intent, and instead adopts 
Lawrence Solum's view that originalism should be based on the 
likely understanding of the words used by competent speakers at 
13. Other scholars read Bingham as firmly grounded in natural rights 
constitutionalism. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL Or RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 1 X I-X7 (199X); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND TilE BILL OF RIGHTS 64 (1990); Rebecca E. 
Zietlow, Congressional F.nforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham's Theory of 
Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717,719,742 (2003). 
14. But see Brct Boyce, The Magic Mirror of "Original Meaning": Recent Approaches 
to the Fourteenth Amendment, 66 ME. L. REV. 29,47--60 (2013) (Lash fails to overcome the 
conflicting evidence of Bingham's views). 
15. ~·.g., RAOUL BERGER, (iOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 145 (1977); Harrison, supra note X, at 1404 n.61. See 
also Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original 
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866-1867, 6X OHIO ST. L.J. 1509, 1536--37 
(2007) (discussing reception of Bingham hy scholars). 
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the time of ratification. 16 Lash's focus in the first half of the book 
on antebellum legal usage, and on specific usages of Members of 
Congress in 1866, establishes the linguistic context for how the 
public generally understood the words used in the Amendment. 
In a sense, chapter four is where his rubber meets the road; this is 
where Lash connects the antebellum meaning that he claims was 
chosen by Bingham to the public understanding of those who 
would ratify the Amendment. 
Lash is certainly not the first to focus on the ratification 
period. 17 But, as Lash notes, the records of ratification debates are 
rather thin, especially regarding the meaning of Section One. 
Lash rightly recognizes that the election of 1866 is an alternative 
source of public meaning, since a focal point of the election 
involved the Republican Party's proposed Amendment and the 
opposition to it by President Johnson and his Democratic and 
conservative Republican allies. It is here that Lash does some of 
his most valuable work, discussing in detail the essays, press 
reports of speeches, and other materials that reflect the public 
debate. 
Lash first observes that the congressional debates about the 
Amendment were widely covered and reprinted in the press. Lash 
then argues that Andrew Johnson's choice to wage a national 
campaign against the Amendment and the Republican Party 
brought the language of the Amendment, including the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, to the fore. Then, when former 
confederates initiated violent and brutal attacks against blacks in 
Memphis in May and attacked a biracial political convention in 
New Orleans in July, the need for protecting citizens' rights 
became a central election issue. Lash argues that in response to 
the violence and Johnson's campaign against the Amendment, 
advocates of ratification began including statements about how 
the Amendment would protect speech and assembly rights (pp. 
204-210). This, he says, indicated a clear understanding that the 
16. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, H2 
FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013). This is a definitional shirt for Lash, who, in the articles on 
which the hook is hased, descrihed puhlic meaning as placing a "special emphasis ... on 
those with the authority to ratify the text and make it an official part of the Constitution." 
Kurt Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John /Jingham and 
the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, YY GEO. L..J. 32Y, 33Y (2011 ). 
17. William Nelson's work remains among the authoritative works on the history 
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO .JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1 YXX). See also 
.JOSEPH B . .lAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1 YX4). 
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Amendment ensured application of the Bill of Rights to the 
states. 
For Lash, the election of 1866 represents the apotheosis of 
the original public meaning of the Amendment and its Privileges 
or Immunities Clause. Because it was a campaign document, 
drafted in order to secure the support of moderate Republicans, 
the Amendment is, for Lash, a relatively modest effort to enforce 
the Bill of Rights against state governments: 
... Section One was, literally, a moderate proposal. The text 
did not federalize common law civil rights, and it avoided 
nationalizing the rights of suffrage. Advocates presented the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as doing nothing more than 
securing those rights already announced in the federal 
Constitution. This reading of "privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States" had a history stretching back into 
statutes and treaties of the early nineteenth century, such as the 
Louisiana Cession Act of 1803. The key proponents of the 
Fourteenth Amendment brought this antebellum 
understanding of national privileges or immunities into the 
public consciousness through their explanations of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause . 
. . . A far more radical proposal would have been to federalize 
the list of "fundamental" rights described by Justice Bushrod 
Washington in Corjield v. Coryell. As much as this might have 
been the preference of radical Repub[licansJ, such a proposal 
had no chance of passage in the Thirty-Ninth Congress and 
would have significantly undermined Republican efforts in the 
elections of 1866 (p. 227). 
Lash concludes The Fourteenth Amendnzent and the 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship with two chapters on 
post-ratification interpretations. While acknowledging that this is 
less persuasive for originalists, especially since it can involve post-
hoc efforts to implement interpretations that were previously 
rejected, he believes that the consistency of the interpretation 
supports his analysis of the public meaning. 1!; 
I X. This portion of the hook is also valuahlc and I will consider it hclow. But since 
Lash sees this evidence as less significant and his presentation of it is meant to merely 
confirm the Bill-of-Rights-hut-no-fundamental-rights interpretation of the original 
meaning, I will not spend time here summarizing it. 
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II. 
Lash's case for a Bill-of-Rights-only view of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause rests on a series of choices-selection, 
emphasis, and interpretation. These choices are neither so clear 
nor so unladen as he would have us believe. And because his 
ultimate theory of original public meaning rests on the sequential 
structure of these choices, his major thesis is far weaker than it 
may initially seem. More importantly, the flaws in this analysis 
raise fundamental questions about originalism itself. 
A. ANTEBELLUM CITIZENSHIP 
Lash argues that the antebellum usages of the term privileges 
and immunities of citizenship set the context for how the public 
understood the term in Section One during Reconstruction. The 
term, however, had a variety of overlapping and inconsistent uses, 
encompassing everything from organizational membership rights 
to local and state legal rights to basic rights of national citizenship. 
"Privileges" could even refer to the anti-democratic and 
illegitimate award of special favors to wealthy or connected 
persons (p. 19). Like the idea of citizenship, privileges and 
immunities contained both egalitarian and exclusionary strands. 19 
This multifarious background would appear to make it hard 
to locate a single public meaning for the term. Lash attempts to 
work around this by sketching two more precise legal meanings 
for the privileges and immunities of citizenship: the Comity 
Clause's privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states, 
which protected equal access to a limited set of state-conferred 
rights while traveling, and the wholly separate privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States, which focused on 
constitutionally enumerated rights (p. 26). 
The problem is that one cannot so easily read free-standing 
natural rights out of these sources, nor can one so nicely trace the 
clear separation of state-based rights from federal rights. This is 
especially evident in Lash's reading of the pivotal case of Corfield 
v. Coryell. Although Lash correctly observes that Justice 
Washington's discussion of the content of privileges and 
immunities protected by Article IV was dicta, it is very hard to 
read Washington's language as not based on natural rights: 
19. On the complexity of citizenship concepts, sec LINDA K. KERBER, No 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO l3E LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLICIATIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP (199X); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997). 
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The inquiry is, what arc the privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several states? W c feel no hesitation in confining 
these expressions to those privileges and immunities which arc, 
in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the 
citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, 
been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which 
compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, 
. d d d . 20 m cpen ent, an sovereign. 
Washington proceeded to list illustrative examples of these 
fundamental rights, including government protection, the 
enjoyment of life, liberty, property, the right to pursue happiness 
and safety, the right to travel and engage in trade, the right to use 
the courts, and the right to vote. 21 Lash argues that Washington 
wrote descriptively, not normatively: he only meant that states 
had granted these rights historically, not that they had to grant the 
rights because they were inherent in the nature of men or free 
government. Radical Republicans, argues Lash, n1istakenly read 
natural rights into the opinion, which caused Bingham to switch 
tracks to the privileges and immunities of United States 
citizenship language instead. 
This gives far too little credit, however, to the radical 
Republicans and requires a rather cramped reading of 
Washington's text that is contrary to most scholarly views. To the 
contrary, a natural rights reading of the concept of privileges and 
immunities was common in the antebellum period. 22 Moreover, 
commentators such as Joseph Story, Chancellor Kent, and Joseph 
Pomeroy each argued for natural rights limits on state power. 23 
20. 6 F. Cas. 546,551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1~23). 
21. !d. at 551-52. 
22. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 13, at 177-7~; NELSON, supra note 17, at 24--27; G. 
Edward White, The Origins of Civil Rights in America, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 755,765-
66 (2014). See also David Upham, Corficld v. Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of 
American Citizenship, ~3 TEX. L. REV. 14~3, 1512-17 (2005) (suggesting that Corfield 
relied on a comhination of natural and positive rights). 
23. Story wrote: 
It seems to he the general opinion, fortified hy a strong current of judicial opinion, 
that, since the American revolution, no state government can be presumed to 
possess the transcendental sovereignty to take away vested rights of property; to 
take the property of A and transfer to B hy a mere legislative act. That 
government can scarcely he deemed to he free, where the rights of property arc 
left solely dependent upon a legislative hody, without any restraint. The 
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, that the rights of 
pcrsonallihcrty and private property should he held sacred. At least, no court of 
justice in this country would he warranted in assuming, that any State legislature 
possessed a power to violate and disregard them; or that such a power, so 
repugnant to the common principles of justice and civillihcrty, lurked under any 
general grant of legislative authority, or ought to he implied from any general 
expression of the will of the people, in the usual forms of the constitutional 
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And such a view, which posits pre-existing rights that states 
protect but do not confer, comports well with Washington's text. 
The point, however, is not that either a natural rights reading or a 
state-conferred reading is necessarily correct, but that both 
interpretations existed together and that each interacted with 
ideas of federalism and dual sovereignty. It is essential to any 
hermeneutics of "public" meaning to account for these overlaps 
and multiplicities, and Lash's effort to interpret them away is 
largely unsuccessful. 
Lash also fails to capture alternative meanings for the term 
"privileges and immunities of United States citizenship." Lash 
relies heavily on antebellum treaties for evidence that "privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States" referred only to 
rights enumerated in the Constitution and did not include the 
general privileges and immunities granted by states or any general 
fundamental rights protected by states. The sources, however, do 
not support this fine of a distinction. 
The antebellum treaty language Lash cites provided these 
new residents "the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens 
of the United States" (p. 48). The treaties did not specify what 
these privileges were and did not expressly limit them to those 
enumerated in the Constitution. 24 Indeed, contract and property 
rights were often key rights for these residents. The protection of 
property claims of former Mexican citizens, for example, was a 
crucial aspect of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended 
the Mexican-American War in 1848, and the treaty specifically 
referred to the protection of property and contract rights of the 
citizens who transferred and those who remained Mexican 
citizens. The treaty also connected those rights of contract and 
property to the protections afforded "citizens of the United 
delegation of power. The people ought not he presumed to part with rights so 
vital to their security and well heing, without very strong and positive declarations 
to that effect. 
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 
13lJ3, at 26X-6lJ. The Constitution of John Bingham's Ohio included similar natural rights 
language. See Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. 
Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 5Xl}, 5YX-l}l} (2003). See also 
BARNETT, supra note 3, at 53-X6 (exploring the natural rights inlluences in the founding 
and antehellum periods). See also WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1 X4X, at 166 (1lJ77) ( descrihing Story's view of 
Article IV as creating a general, or national, citizenship); Daniel A. Farher & John E. 
Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. CoMMENT. 235, 
245 (19X4) (discussing Kent); Smith, supra note lJ, at 371-77 (discussing Kent and 
Pomeroy). 
24. See Boyce, supra note 14, at 46. 
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States. "25 The rights and privileges of these new residents were 
contested and legally ambiguous, and the treaties cannot serve as 
reliable sources for derivinp specific meaning for such 
intentionally general language. 2 
Moreover, there is some evidence that the concept and 
language of national privileges could refer to state-based 
privileges. John Jay, in Federalist 2, stated that ''·To all general 
purposes we have uniformly been one people. Each individual 
citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, 
and protection." 27 Similarly, Attorney General \Villiam Wirt, in 
his 1821 opinion concluding that free blacks from Virginia could 
not be United States citizens, emphasized that the constitutional 
concept of "citizens of the United States" necessarily was limited 
to "those only who enjoyed the full and e~ual privileges of white 
citizens in the State of their residence." H Both Jay and Wirt 
connected United States citizenship with the traditional state-
based privileges and rights, thus contradicting Lash's distinction 
between the two. 
As these admittedly brief examples suggest, historical usages 
of the concept of the "privileges and immunities of citizens" and 
"privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" 
contained uncertainty and ambiguity. This creates a building 
block problem. Recall that Lash argues that Bingham 
intentionally used the term "citizens of the United States" for the 
25. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, U.S.-Mcx., art. VIII, Fch. 2, Jg4X, 9 Stat. 922. Lash 
cites Article IX of the treaty, which included a version of the language hascd on the 
Louisiana Cession Treaty, Article III (p. 50). Nothing in the Hidalgo treaty indicates that 
the rights associated with United States citizenship were limited to enumerated rights, and 
Article VIII indicates that the rights included full protection of property and contract 
(protections that Congress eroded through implementing legislation). On the treaty and 
its legacy, sec RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, TilE TREATY OF GUADALUPE 
HIDALGO: A LEGACY OF CONFLICt' (1992); Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: 
Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REV. 
201 (1996). 
26. The new inhahitants hcgan under United States jurisdiction with the hasic laws 
of contract and property of their former sovereigns (France and Spain) and only 
transferred to the legal regime of the United States over time, as was common under 
international law in such cases. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: 
Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over 
Foreign Affairs, XI TEX. L. REV. I, 174-75 (2003). They attained hasic rights, including 
contract and property rights, through territorial governments (that is, under federal law), 
and essential questions like whether people could he enslaved or own slaves were highly 
controversial. /d. at 1X9-91. 
27. THE FEDERALIST No.2 (John Jay). 
2X. Rights of Free Negroes in Virginia, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 506, S00---07 (1 X21 ). This 
position was then adopted hy Wirt's successor and not reversed until the Civil War. Ryan 
C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493, 513-
14, 525 (2013). See also Boyce, supra note 14, at 40 n.65. 
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purpose of distinguishing enumerated rights from state-based 
fundamental rights. But since Bingham never actually said this, 
Lash must rely on the fact that the term was an antebellum "term-
of-art" with a specific and discrete meaning. If, instead, there were 
multiple meanings or the terms at issue were intentionally vague, 
their antebellum "meaning" does not do the work Lash needs 
them to do when he analyzes the public meaning of the proposed 
Amendment in 1866. 
B. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DEBATES 
A similar issue arises in Lash's presentation of the debates 
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment. Lash's analysis rests on 
the proposition that John Bingham changed the text of the draft 
of the Amendment from his initial parroting of the language of 
the Comity Clause to language invoking the antebellum term-of-
art "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." 
Bingham did this, according to Lash, in order to have the Clause 
encompass the Bill of Rights but still exclude other fundamental 
rights not enumerated in the Constitution (p. 174). 
Unfortunately for Lash, however, there is simply too much 
competing evidence that the fundamental rights view often 
associated with Corfield retained interpretive force throughout 
these debates. 2" The most glaring evidence of this is Senator Jacob 
Howard's references to the case in his speech introducing the 
Amendment to the Senate in May 1866.30 As Lash notes, Howard, 
who was also on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction that 
drafted the text along with Bingham, gave the speech that became 
most closely associated with the Amendment during the 
congressional elections later that year (and even earned it the 
nickname of "the 'Howard Amendment"') (p. 227). 
Howard's clear and deliberate listing of each of the Bill of 
Rights has made the speech a standard source for Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporationist arguments. 31 But it is his discussion 
of the other source of citizenship privileges that is most 
problematic for Lash. Howard began his speech by informing the 
Senate that Section One of the Amendment "relates to the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states," 
2Y. See BARNETf, supra note 3; REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: 
CONGRESS, TilE CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 57 
(2006). 
30. CONG. GLOBE, 3Yth Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (May 23, 1Xt16). 
31. E.g., CURTIS, supra note 13, atXX-XY. 
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equating the Fourteenth Amendment phrase "privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States" with the Comity 
Clause. Thus, from the opening bell, Howard drew precisely the 
connection that Lash suggests Bingham intended to avoid in 
adding the phrase "citizens of the Unites States." Howard then 
stated that the purpose of the Comity Clause was "to put the 
citizens of the several States on an equality with each other as to 
all fundamental rights .... "l2 
This is already an enthusiastic embrace of the radical 
Republican view of the Comity Clause and American citizenship. 
But Howard continued, citing the very language from Corfield 
that had been a staple of radical Republican argum.ents and which 
Lash contends had been abandoned months before. 3l Howard's 
quote of Corfield included the language where Justice 
Washington defined the privileges and immunities protected 
under the Comity Clause as those that "are in their nature 
fundamental, which belong of right to the citizens of all free 
Governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the 
citizens of the several States which compose this Union." 34 
Howard then continued reading the opinion and Justice 
Washington's list of specific rights, including life and liberty, 
transactions in property, the pursuit and obtaining of happiness 
and safety, the conduct of trade and business, and even suffrage. 35 
Howard asserted that these rights, along with the Bill of Rights, 
encompassed "a mass of privileges, immunities and rights" and 
were part of the substance of rights the Fourteenth Amendment 
sought to protect and empower Congress to enforce. 36 
Curiously, Lash says that Howard believed the content of 
Article IV privileges was "of little current importance" (p. 156). 
32. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Scss. 2766 (May 23, 1H66). 
33. At one point Lash hccomcs overly enthusiastic in his reading of the evolution of 
the usage of Corfield, stating that, "Radical Republican leaders in the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress ultimately stopped referring to Corfield altogether" (p. 114). Lash later 
acknowledges, alhcit hy downplaying it, that Howard's pivotal speech in late May quoted 
Corfield (p. 157). 
34. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Scss. 2765 (May 23, 1X66) (quoting Corficld, supra 
note 12). 
35. !d. Howard later in the speech expressly excluded suffrage from his list, 
consistent with the agreement of Republicans not to push for that right in 1X66. !d. at 2766. 
36. !d. at 2765. See AMAR, supra note 13, at 17X ("Corfield was ... read hroadly hy 
Jacoh Howard in his influential speech on section 1, which invoked ho1Lh Washington's ode 
and the Bill or Rights as exemplifying 'privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States."'). Howard also noted that the fundamental rights covered hy Article IV "arc not 
and cannot he fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature," CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Scss. 2765 (May 23, 1X66), suggesting that there arc uncnumcratcd rights even 
hcyond those listed in Corfield. 
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Lash here misreads Howard's rhetorical understatement as 
essentially erasing Howard's reference to "fundamental rights." If 
Howard had believed that the list of specific rights in Corfield 
were unimportant, he would not have read the quote into the 
record, nor would he have immediately referred to them as the 
very rights included in the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and 
given them equal weight to the Bill of Rights. Despite Lash's 
attempts to reinterpret Howard's speech, it plainly embraced the 
radical Republican view of fundamental rights. 37 As with Lash's 
reading of antebellum law and Corjteld, the point is not that the 
natural or fundamental rights interpretation of Howard and 
others was correct, but that throughout 1866 it was sufficiently 
prominent that it held some status in the "public" or general 
understanding of the language of Section One. 3~ 
C. CIVIL RIGHTS BILL 
A similar flaw runs through Lash's treatment of the Civil 
Rights Bill and its relationship with the Amendment. The Civil 
Rights Bill was debated and drafted simultaneously with the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Its language bears strong similarities to 
Section One, and for these reasons it is a standard piece of 
Fourteenth Amendment history to read them in parallel. 39 And 
because it was supported with citations to Corfield and more of 
the fundamental rights analysis that Lash rejects, its links to the 
Amendment present potential problems for Lash's analysis. 
Lash contends that the two should not be read together 
because "the texts were proposed by different men and for 
different purposes" and because John Bingham did not support 
37. Lash's attempt to downplay Howard's speech is one of the weaker sections of his 
hook. He re-characterizes Howard's speech as adopting the non-fundamental rights 
reading of the Comity Clause, which Lash had earlier suggested was the standard 
antchcllum reading. Lash then says that "nothing in Howard's speech" supports the claim 
that he advanced a fundamental rights view of the privileges of federal citizenship (p. 15X). 
It seems to me impossihlc to read Howard's discussion of the Comity Clause and Corfield 
and their connection to Section One as "nothing." 
3K See NI-<:LSON, supra note 17, at 123 (the framers and ratificrs expressed 
"conflicting commitments" ahout whether and how the Amendment secured fundamental 
or ahsolutc rights and ahout the content of those rights; originalist analysis cannot resolve 
this issue). 
3lJ. Act of Apr. l), 1 X66, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. For scholars who read the Civil Rights 
Act as important for understanding the Amendment, sec, e.g., AMAR, supra note 13, at 
1l)4--l)7; GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: THE 
CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF IX66, at 70-lJ2 (2013); 
ZIETLOW, supra note 2l), at 41-42; White, supra note 22, at 772-76. Seeing the Act as 
interpretively helpful is not the same as seeing it as limiting or identical to the Amendment, 
a mistake Amar identifies in earlier originalists, such as Raoul Berger. 
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the Act (pp. 113-114 ). 40 He also argues that the Bill was rewritten 
to conform to a more moderate view of Article IV and 
congressional powers, "likely" in response to Johnson's veto of 
the Freedmen's Bureau Bill (p. 135). 
Once again, however, there is a sizable record pointing the 
other way. First, the initial sentence of the Atnendment-the 
Citizenship Clause-was modelled after the first sentence in the 
Act. As Ryan Williams has recently pointed out, the Citizenship 
Clause was proposed by Senator Howard, who, referring to the 
debates over the Civil Rights Act and its veto, sirrtply stated that 
"the question of citizenship has been so fully discussed in this 
body as not to need any further elucidation .... " 41 This direct 
incorporation of the Civil Rights Bill debates makes it implausible 
that we should read the two separately. 
Later that summer, after the Amendment had been 
submitted for ratification, Lyman Trumbull, drafter and main 
sponsor of the Civil Rights Act, said in a widely published speech 
that Section One 
declares the rights of the American citizen. It is a reiteration of 
the rights as set forth in the Civil Rights Bill, an unnecessary 
declaration, perhaps, because all the rights belong to the 
citizen, but it was thought proper to put in the fundamental law 
the declaration that all good citizens were entitled alike to 
equal rights in this Republic .... 42 
Similarly, in describing the Civil Rights Act, Trumbull stated that 
[I]ts great feature was to confer upon every person born upon 
American soil the right of American citizenship, and every 
thing belonging to the free citizen of the Republic. [Cheers] In 
other words, it was to make all persons equal before the law-
equal in right to acquire property, to dispose of property, to 
make contracts, enforce contracts, and in every right which 
b I 43 e ongs to man as a man. 
An even more detailed exposition of the fundamental rights 
defense of the bill was made in response to Johnson's veto in the 
House, where Representative Lawrence described the rights of 
40. See also Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A "l.egislative History", 60 AM. 
lJ. L. REV. 331, 349 (2010). 
41. Williams, supra note 2X, at 544 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Scss. 2X90 
(May 30, 1X66)). 
42. Senator Trumhull, Speech at the Chicago Opera House (Aug. 2, IX66), in 
SPEECHES OF THECA MPAIGN OF THE I X66 ELECTION, INTI IE STATES OF OHIO, INDIANA, 
AND KENTUCKY 6 (The Cincinnati Com. 1XX6). 
43. !d. 
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"national citizenship" as the inalienable rights of men and as 
"existing anterior to and independently of all laws and all 
constitutions."44 Lawrence went on to describe a theory of 
citizenship rights that linked the specific protections of the Civil 
Rights Bill with the commonly described fundamental rights of 
life, liberty, and property as their necessary corollaries.4" 
Lawrence presented a sophisticated justification for the Bill 
grounded in a fundamental rights view of national citizenship. 
Like Senator Howard, Lawrence cited the Cor_field dicta to 
support the point. Lawrence's speech, and a similar one by 
Trumbull, was the primary defense for overriding Johnson's veto 
and enacting the Bill. So, although it is certainly fair for Lash to 
note the multiple possible justifications for the Bill and the fact 
that the Bill and the Amendment were not identical, it is equally 
fair for many other scholars to suggest that a fundamental rights 
view of citizenship and of the privileges of United States 
citizenship influenced both the drafters of the Amendment and 
the public who read these speeches. Lash fails to give this view the 
weight it deserves. 46 
Lash makes one other point in favor of de-linking the debates 
about national citizenship and its rights and privileges in 
connection with the Civil Rights Act from the Amendment: John 
Bingham's opposition to the Act. Lash argues that the Bill, and 
the fundamental rights views expressed by many of its supporters, 
should not be read into the section of Amendment drafted by 
Bingham. But Bingham was addressing the problems of the Bill 
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment. He opposed the Bill with 
and without the "civil rights" language, and he withheld his vote 
when Congress overrode Johnson's veto. 47 Even more 
importantly, in 1870 Bingham voted in favor of the re-enactment 
of the Civil Rights Act after ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (a point not mentioned by Lash). 4~ The best 
explanation for all of these votes is that Bingham- as he himself 
44. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1X32-33 (Apr. 7, 1X66). 
45. /d. at 1X33. 
46. Lash downplays Lawrence's speech, discussing it hridly in footnotes and missing 
its natural rights theme (p. 142 n.309). 
47. Bingham "paired" his vote, meaning that he agreed not to vote, pairing with 
Representative Huhhard, who would have voted in favor of the override hut was 
unavoidahly ahsent. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1X61 (Apr. 9, 1X66). 
4X. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3XX4 (May 27, 1X70) (House approval of 
report of committee of conference recommending approval of the Enforcement Bill which 
included the re-enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1X66). See Act of May 31, 1R70, ch. 
114, * lX, 16 Stat. 140. 
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said- felt Congress lacked power to pass it absent constitutional 
amendment, and that the ratification of the Amendment resolved 
this issue. 49 
D. BLACK CODES 
One of the most curious aspects of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is its failure to discuss the Black Codes. Historian 
Paul Finkelman admonished us several years ago that 
l t]o understand the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment we 
must get beyond the debates in Congress, and attempt to 
understand the context in which the Amendment was framed 
and ratified. . . . An understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment begins, not in Congress, but in the history leading 
h A d 50 up to t e men ment. 
Finkelman added that understanding the Black Codes and the 
deep violence visited upon southern blacks is crucial to 
understanding how white Republicans in Congress understood 
their actions and words in the spring of 1866. 
The Black Codes were intended to retain a coercive, race-
based labor system by denying or restricting blacks from contract 
rights, property ownership, legal recourse and access to courts, 
freedom of travel, control over their own laboc, and rights of 
family and relationships. 51 These attempts by southern whites to 
establish a subordinating legal system as a way of implementing 
the end of slavery infuriated northern Republicans. One of the 
primary activities of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction- the 
Committee that drafted the Amendment-was to investigate the 
Black Codes and the level of violence and abuse being waged by 
former Confederates on freed blacks. 52 It was an investigative as 
well as drafting committee, and its investigation informed 
everything Congress did on matters of Reconstruction.53 When 
49. GERARD N. MAGLIOCC'A, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOliN BINGHAM AND 
THE INVENTION OF TilE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 120 (2013). 
50. Paul Finkelman, The llistorical Context of the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. 
POL. & Clv. RTS. L. REV. 3X9, 390 (2004). 
51. See DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION: TilE BRIEF, 
VIOLENT HISTORY OF AMERICA'S MOST PROGRESSIVE ERA 17X-X4 (2014); ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S lJNriNISIIED REVOLUTION 1X63-JX77, at 199-210 (19XX). 
52. See Finkelman, supra note 50, at 400-02. See generally REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMI'ITEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. NO. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess (IX66) 
(hereinafter "REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE"). 
53. The vast hulk of its XOO-plus page report that summer consisted of evidence 
gathered hy the subcommittees on activities in the South. See generally REPORT OF THE 
JOINT COMMilTEE, supra note 52. 
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Representative Trumbull introduced the Civil Rights Bill, he 
specifically highlighted the need to "destroy all these 
discriminations" found in Black Codes."4 The listing of rights in 
the Bill reflected those rights that had been deemed so valuable 
to the white South that they needed to be denied to blacks. 55 
This background is critical for understanding how Congress, 
and the nation, understood the powers being created by the 
Committee. Lash suggests that Bingham did not intend the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause to cover general "civil rights," 
because such rights were long the province of state governments 
(pp. 128-129). Yet the Black Codes that the Committee and 
Republicans intended to prohibit described themselves as "Civil 
Rights" acts. 511 The Committee received testimony about the 
importance to blacks of securing rights to property and contract, 
and about the violent efforts of whites to suppress such assertions 
of freedom and citizenship. 57 In reporting on its work in June, the 
Joint Committee considered it "impossible to abandon [the 
freedmen], without securing them their rights as free men and 
citizens" and that "[h ]ence it became important to inquire what 
could be done to secure their rights, civil and political. ,sK The 
Committee's answer was the Fourteenth Amendment.59 The 
Committee further stated that, in the face of such violence, 
disorder, and denial of rights, Congress could not readmit 
Southern states without "providing such constitutional and other 
guarantees as will tend to secure the civil rights of all citizens of 
the republic" and that this could only happen through "such 
changes of the organic law as shall determine the civil rights and 
privileges of all citizens in all parts of the republic .... " 60 Congress 
and the public were well aware that the rights being denied 
Southern blacks, and which it intended to protect both in 
54. CONG. GLOBE, 3lJth Cong., 1st Scss. 474. Several of the Black Codes were 
subsequently collected hy the Freedmen's Bureau at the request of Congress. See LAws IN 
RELATION TO FREEDMEN, S. EXEC. DOC. No.6, at 170--230 (2d Scss. 1~67). 
55. See White, supra note 22, at 773. 
56. See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 50, at 403 n.~3 (citing Act of Nov. 25, 1~65, ch. 4, 
1~65 Mississippi Laws ~2 ("an Act for conferring Civil Rights on Freedmen, and for other 
purposes")). 
57. !d. at 404--0lJ. 
5~. REPORT OF JOINT COMMITfEE, supra note 52, at xiii. 
5lJ. Although many the members of the Committee did not believe Section One 
covered voting rights, they addressed suffrage in a more circumspect, hut potentially 
important, manner in Section Two. The Fifteenth Amendment and its Enforcement Acts 
rendered Section Two moot. 
60. REPORT OF JOINT COMMITfEE, supra note 52, at xviii, xxi. Bingham signed this 
Report. 
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legislation and the new Amendment, were considered "civil 
. ht ,61 ng s. 
One of the hazards of mapping antebellum legal meanings 
onto the 1866 debates is that we miss the evolutionary nature of 
legal, political, and cultural meaning, especially in times of 
fundamental changes and re-ordering. Citizenship was shifting 
from an amorphous concept ill-defined in law, to a definite status 
directly connected to the nation as a whole. With this change came 
a new idea of federal powers and duties- protection of citizens 
within states. And with these shifts came changes to ideas of the 
privileges and immunities of citizenship and to civil rights. As 
George Rutherglen has recently observed, the tenm "civil rights" 
itself transitioned from referring to private comrnon law rights 
before the war to a more public concept of access to the essentials 
of civil society.62 The privileges of federal citizenship were 
merging with those of state citizenship, but the extent of that 
merger and its effect on the relative powers of federal and state 
governments over them remained unclear and in flux. Lash's 
relatively static approach to public, political, and legal meaning 
misses such changes. 
E. ELECTION OF 1866 
Lash suggests that the elections of 1866 provide strong 
evidence of public understandings, because the A1nendment and 
its debates had been reported in the press extensively in the first 
half of the year, and also because President Johnson made the 
Amendment a focal point of the election and his effort to unseat 
Republicans from Congress (pp. 189-191 ). This is certainly true; 
the elections have been under-studied by constitutional law 
scholars and The Fourteenth Amendment goes a long way to help 
remedy this neglect. 
But these elections also highlight some fundamental 
difficulties for public meaning originalism. Public understandings 
are rarely precise and the sea of arguments and rhetoric in which 
elections are held contain currents and cross-currents shallow and 
deep, none of which can be said to overtake all others. For 
instance, what are we to do with the statements of the drafters 
61. [<_,'.g., Carl Schurz, Major-General, The State of the Country, Speech at the 
National Hall (Sept. X, IX66), in THE PHILADELPHIA INOUIRER, Sept. 10, 1X66, at 2, 
available at http://en.wikisource.org/wikitrhe_State_of_the_Country (last visited May 21, 
2015) (describing the Amendment and asking "Is it wrong that the civil rights of American 
citizens should he placed directly under the shield of the National Constitution?"). 
62. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 39, at 4; see also White, supra note 22, at 770-XO. 
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from earlier that year? Lash discusses how Senator Howard's 
speech introducing the final Amendment to the Senate in May 
was widely published and cited (pp. 187-188). Yet Lash focuses on 
only one part of Howard's speech: the incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights (p. 189). As discussed above, Howard's speech included an 
extended quote from Corfield and equated the privileges of 
citizenship with the fundamental rights listed by Justice 
Washington in that case. Howard's speech, unlike Bingham's 
earlier speeches, set forth the more radical understanding of 
privileges and immunities, one that combined the Bill of Rights 
and state-based rights and which left room for unenumerated 
rights. By the same token, Bingham's speeches-which did not so 
clearly embrace open-ended fundamental rights-had also been 
widely published. But so had Senator Trumbull's speeches. 
Indeed, much of the debate surrounding both the Civil Rights Act 
(and especially the veto override) and the drafting of the 
Amendment had been covered by, and often reprinted in, the 
press. 
This proliferation of overlapping meanings continued into 
the fall campaign. As Lash notes, many speeches "expressly tied 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Civil Rights 
Act" (p. 194). What could the public have possibly taken from 
such references? On the one hand, these speakers indicated a 
position contrary to Bingham's that identified the substantive 
rights in the Act and the broad fundamental rights justifications 
of its supporters with the purposes of the Amendment. 63 On the 
other hand, the Act focused on the equality of those rights and the 
Amendment and its advocates also emphasized equal rights 
principles. And what does one make of speeches such as that of 
Speaker Colfax defining Section One as "the Declaration of 
Independence placed immutably and forever in our 
Constitution ?"M Certainly the position of Johnson's allies- that 
the Act and the Amendment should be opposed because they 
were a dangerous centralization of power wrongly favoring blacks 
over whites-was rejected by the voting public. But just what did 
they reject? Did they disagree with his characterization of the 
Amendment and see it as a more moderate proposal? Or did they 
63. Speech of Representative Colfax, Aug. 7, IX66, in SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN 
OF THE 1X66 ELECTION, supra note 43, at 14 (the Civil Rights Act "specifically and directly 
declares what the rights of a citizen of the United States arc-that they may make and 
enforce contracts, sue and he parties, give evidence, purchase, lease and sell property, and 
he subject to like punishments."). 
64. /d. 
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agree that it was a radical text and nonetheless embrace the 
expansion of national power to protect equal access to citizen 
rights? 
The difficulty in trying to find a precise meaning for such 
generalized concepts is that politicians, especially during the 
election, favor rhetoric over precision. Political rhetoric inspires 
people to vote, while the ambiguity and vagueness help avoid 
disagreement over details. While it is possible to find references 
in the speeches and writings to some specific rights-the rights to 
speech, press, and assembly were some of the most common-
these materials simply do not support Lash's broader claim that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause enc01npassed only 
specifically enumerated rights (and did not include the 
fundamental rights interpretations of the Comity Clause or of 
citizenship rights generally).65 The discussions during the election, 
to the extent they addressed citizenship and its privileges, were 
most often feats of high rhetoric, with occasional suggestive (not 
limiting) examples most likely to catch the public's emotions.66 
The election debates are also unreliable evidence for Lash's 
type of public meaning originalism because much of the debate 
over the election focused not on Section One, but on Sections 
Two, Three, Four, and the general conflict between Congress and 
the President. The Report of the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction devoted only one paragraph of its fifteen page 
substantive report of its activities to the issues covered by Section 
One, and even there the focus was on the connections between 
securing civil rights and the hope that Section Two could secure 
political rights for blacks to better enable their ability to protect 
their civil rights. 67 The Committee focused the rest of the report 
on the powers of Congress, the obstructionism of the President, 
the illegality of secession, and the illegitimacy and injustices of 
Southern governments. The report thus concentrated on 
justifications for other sections of the Amendment. for the refusal 
to seat Southern representatives, and, ultimately, for Congress's 
65. See FONER, supra note 51, at 257-5H (in the election of l H66 Rcpuhlicans 
expressed differing views of the Amendment, hut even moderates "understood 
Reconstruction as a dynamic process, in which phrases like 'privileges and immunities' 
were suhjcct to changing interpretation"). 
66. William Nelson has a made a similar point in explaining conflicting Rcpuhlican 
rhetoric regarding fundamental rights, equality, and states' rights. Sec NELSON, supra note 
17, at 123 ("Memhcrs of Congress and the state legislatures were more concerned with the 
articulation of rhetorical principles that might inspire sound civic hchavior than with the 
dahoration of precise doctrine that could he used to control faulty conduct."). 
67. REPORT OF TilE JOINT COMMITfEE, supra note 52, at xiii. 
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right to take a greater role in Reconstruction. The same can be 
seen in many of the campaign speeches, where the question of 
whether former Confederates should sit in the next Congress took 
center stage. 6x And, tellingly, President Johnson, in his series of 
speeches around the North that fall, "never mentioned the 
Fourteenth Amendment." 69 
The election of 1866 was certainly fought on the ground of 
how best to address Reconstruction, and the Amendment was a 
key component of that debate. But the issues were far too 
intertwined to identify one particular strand as having the focus 
and attention to rise above the others. These political debates 
included many differing "understandings" and representations 
about the Amendment, Section One, citizenship, rights, and 
privileges. The election did not reflect support for a particular 
interpretive position or for clearly defined, legalistic distinctions 
for the words used in the Amendment, and it could not have 
provided specific support for the idea that that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause referred to ideas derived from antebellum 
treaties. 70 
Moreover, it is entirely plausible that the "meaning" of the 
election centered as much around the direction that Republicans 
were obviously headed as on the past out of which abolitionists 
and moderates had come. Consider, for example, the question of 
black suffrage. Although some radical Republicans in Congress 
supported black suffrage, many Republicans- especially those 
courting the votes of racist whites in border and western states 
and counties- believed it politically necessary to deny that 
Section One included political privileges. But it was also well-
known that the party, and especially the radicals, wanted to go 
further. 71 During the campaign, the more radical Republican 
supporters argued that Congress should require black suffrage 
prior to the readmission of Southern states. 72 And it was common 
oX. Speech of Governor Morton, July 27, 1Xoo, in SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 
THE 1Xoo ELECTION, supra note 43, at 3. See also Speech of Representative Shellaharger, 
Aug. lo, 1Xoo, in id., at 11-12; Speech of Representative Garfield, Aug. 22, 1Xoo, in id., at 
lX; Speech of Representative Ashley, Aug. 22, 1Xoo, in id., at 1X. 
69. FONER, supra note 51, at 265. 
70. See also Boyce, supra note 14, at n2-o3 (discussing amhiguous evidence ahout the 
amendment from the 1Xon election campaign). 
71. E.g., Speech of Representative Garfield, Aug. 22, 1 Xoo, in SPEECHES OF THE 
CAMPAIGN OF THE 1 Xon ELECTION, supra note 43, at 1 X (supporting hlack suffrage). 
72. See, e.g., VICTOR B. HOWARD, RELIGION AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICAN 
MOVEMENT, 1Xn0-1X70 140-44 (1990) (religious organizations, journals, and preachers 
who supported radicals advocated for suffrage during campaign and viewed it as a natural 
right). 
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for discussions about whether white rebels should regain political 
power and seats in Congress to refer to the politicalJJfivileges of 
voting and representation as privileges of citizenship. 73 By voting 
for Republican candidates, voters would have expressed not only 
approval of their actions from spring 1866 but also support for the 
reasonable assumptions about their policies going forward. If 
significant movement in the direction of black suffrage was 
expected in fall 1866 should Republicans increase their majorities, 
this raises the possibility that the "public meaning" of the 
privileges of citizenship was that it could include political 
privileges. 74 
Similarly, the 1866 election could easily be read as approving 
the Republican version of constitutional interpretation that 
enabled them to pass the Civil Rights Act as part of their 
enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment (and so 
rejecting Bingham's view of congressional powers). Theirs was a 
generous, but certainly plausible, interpretation of the 
enforcement power in the Thirteenth Amendment, and one that 
allowed Congress significant leeway in interpreting the 
Amendment through enforcement. By approving that example, 
the public's understanding of the enforcement power (a power 
also included in the Fourteenth Amendment) could be seen as 
sufficiently broad to enable Republicans to interpret Section One 
of the Fourteenth Amendment just as the Democrats and 
1 ohnsonians proclaimed they would. 
F. RATIFICATION 
In focusing on the importance of the neglected 1866 election 
on our understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, Lash 
downplays the ratification period itself. Of the over 300 pages of 
a book whose subject is the public meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, only three pages address the ratification period 
after March 4, 1867 (the last day of the 39th Congress) through 
July 1868. The disproportionate focus on the period prior to 
73. E.g., Address of Lorenzo Sherwood, Southern Loyalists' Convention, in REPORT 
OF THE COMMITI'EE ON UNRECONSTRUCTED STATES 30 (1X66). 
74. See, e.g., JAMES ALEX 8AGGETr, THE SCALAWAGS: SOUTHERN DISSENTERS IN 
TilE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 179 (2004) (Southern loyalists viewed hlack 
suffrage as an important aspect of the Repuhlican victory in 1X66). Although Lash is firmly 
convinced that Section One was understood not to include a right to suffrage, historian 
William Nelson has shown that suffrage was one of the many unresolved aspects of the 
Amendment. NELSON, supra note 17, at 6, 124-33. As Nelson ohserves, even Bingham 
argued that the Amendment gave Congress power to require equal suffrage rights in the 
readmitted states./d. at 130. 
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March 1867 is justified, for Lash, because of the dearth of 
evidence of the ratification debates in state conventions and 
legislatures. 
The problem is that the ratification period extended for 
another seventeen months. In that time not only would the 
additional eight states necessary for ratification issue their 
support, but all those states came from the South, each havin~ 
voted against ratification in the period surrounding the election. 5 
At the end of February 1867, twelve states had rejected the 
Amendment, more than enough to defeat it. 76 Only with African-
American political activism and participation in southern 
conventions and legislatures, which had been mandated by 
congressional Reconstruction Acts, would ratification eventually 
be secured. 
Several scholars view the fact that ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment occurred only through military 
occupation of the South as undermining its political legitimacy. 
Some, like Bruce Ackerman, see this as evidence that 
Reconstruction was an extraordinary constitutional moment, and 
argue that in such moments the "normal" rules do not apply.77 
Other see the ratification "problem" as evidence that originalism 
cannot have purchase on claims of democratic "legitimacy"; 
rather, the true legitimacy of the Amendment lies in its 
acceptance over time in law, politics, and society. 7~ Lash 
acknowledges the supposed legitimacy problem, but suggests that 
the public debates from 1866 are nonetheless a sufficient basis for 
finding reliable public meaning behind the text. 
What these views share is an almost dismissive approach to 
the ratification process in the 1867-68 Southern states. 
Considering that Southern ratification engaged and included 
African-American men in the constitutional process far more 
significantly than at any point in American history to that time, 
that black participation was unquestionably central to the success 
of ratification, and that one of the purposes of the Amendment 
was to secure freedom and full citizenship for the formerly 
enslaved and nominally free black citizens, it is deeply 
75. FONER, supra note 51, at 26Y. 
76. EGERTON, supra note 51, at 220. 
77. BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6--7,45-46 (1YY1). 
7X. Thomas B. Colhy, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1627, 162<.) (2013) (the fourteenth amendment "was a purely partisan 
measure, drafted and enacted entirely hy Republicans in a rump Reconstruction congress," 
and was ratified "at gunpoint"). 
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problematic to exclude this period from the analysis. The 
Fourteenth Amendment, by substituting the 1866 election (in 
which a relatively few blacks could participate) for the full period 
of ratification, shifts the focus away from the more radical 
activities of Congress and the states in 1867 and 1868 and 
overlooks the possible impact of understandings of the 
Amendment and its principles by black members of the ratifying 
bl. 79 pu 1c. 
To the contrary, it could be argued that the structure of 
congressional reconstruction in the South, and especially its 
biracial aspect, is an even more appropriate basis for investigating 
public understandings of the Amendment which would not be 
ratified until July 1868. To focus on such evidence, however, 
would require a shift in the type of materials and the interpretive 
approach taken by originalists. Rather than looking for references 
to the specific words used in the Amendment, the focus would 
need to shift to the actions taken by Congress and state 
legislatures as part of radical Reconstruction, and the debates and 
discussions about the more general principles animating the 
Amendment. It would also benefit from considering the views and 
actions of African-Americans who made ratification possible, and 
who pressed white Republicans toward suffrage and full 
citizenship rights. Unfortunately, this type of an approach to 
public meaning is missing from The Fourteenth Anzendment. 
III. 
The failure of The Fourteenth Amendment to address how the 
Amendment was a response to the Black Codes and its shift away 
from the late-ratification period in favor of the 1866 election are 
both symptoms of a larger problem with originalist approaches to 
the Fourteenth Amendment: the tendency to ignore the voices 
and perspectives of those not already embedded within the 
political and legal process.xo African-Americans play almost no 
role in The Fourteenth Amendment, despite the fact that they were 
79. On the importance or hlack participation in post-! X66 southern politics, including 
ratification, sec STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL 
STRUGGLES IN THE RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION 163-215 
(2003); FONER, supra note 51, at 2X1-345. 
XO. See Jamal Greene, Originalism's Race Problem, XX DENY. U. L. REV. 517, 51X-9 
(2011); Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 97X, 979 
(2012). Liberal or progressive originalists rare little hcttcr in this respect. See, e.g., JACK 
BALKIN, LIVING 0RIGINALISM (2014). On this problem, sec James W. Fox Jr., 
Counterpublic Originalism and the l!,'xclusionary Critique, 67 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016). 
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essential to its ratification, important actors in pressing white 
Republicans to a more radical and progressive view, participants 
in the initial state and federal implementations of the 
Amendment's principles, and the initial intended beneficiaries of 
the Amendment. Similarly, feminists, who actively advocated for 
a broader interpretation of the Amendment- having been 
excluded from drafting, ratifying, and implementing it-make 
only a brief appearance in The Fourteenth Amendment, and that 
mainly as a foil for better explaining the views of John Bingham 
on a more general point about the Privilege or Immunities Clause. 
As we will see, this exclusion of alternative voices assumes a 
particular yet unspoken view of public meaning as a unitary 
concept formed by the very people who are benefiting from the 
exclusions. By adopting this restrictive view of the "public" and 
"public meaning," originalists risk embracing the very problem of 
democratic illegitimacy that many originalists seek to overcome. 81 
A. LEGAL TEXT AS EXCLUSION 
It is a common feature of originalism to explore the legal 
meanings for constitutional terms at the time they were adopted. 
The Fourteenth Amendment follows this method by presenting an 
extensive analysis of antebellum uses of the terms "rights," 
"privileges," and "immunities" from cases, statutes, treaties, and 
congressional debates. But this focus on antebellum legal text and 
discourse excludes precisely those people who were barred from 
the "public" at the founding. This raises two related problems. 
First, because women and blacks were not able to participate 
in the construction of the meaning of antebellum citizenship, 
those meanings lack an important level of procedural democratic 
legitimacy. Antebellum legal constructions of "privileges and 
immunities" and "citizenship" were the product of an 
exclusionary legal system and legal culture. An interpretive 
process that overlays antebellum legal meanings onto the 
Reconstruction Amendments is not likely to solve the procedural 
legitimacy problem confronting originalism. It is possible that one 
could explore the ways in which antebellum concepts were 
understood and used by excluded groups, and from that study 
X1. On the legitimacy prohlcm of originalism, sec Greene, Fourteenth Amendment 
Originalism, supra note XO; Greene, Originalism' s Race Problem, supra note RO; MarkS. 
Stein, Originalism and the Original E-xclusions, YX KY. L.J. 397 (2009-10). For recent 
originalist responses, sec Steven G. Calahrcsi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex 
Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011 ); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1o93 (2010). 
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come to a fuller view of a meaning that is more broadly 
democratic. That, however, is not the aim of most originalists and 
is not the focus of The Fourteenth Amendment. Without that 
effort, reliance on common antebellum legal interpretations 
replicates the problems of democratic legitimacy. 
Second, and more fundamentally, antebellum legal 
constructions of citizenship and its privileges were themselves tied 
to and constitutive of the continued oppression of those excluded 
persons. Not only were women, blacks, and Native Americans 
unable to affect the discourse, the discourse itself operated 
substantively to preserve white male dominance. The concept of 
citizenship in the antebellum period is notorious for its role in 
defining the lines of power and layers of privilege that secured the 
position of white men. x2 One of the reasons for keeping the 
"fundamental" privileges of property ownership within the 
control of states was to maintain Southern slavery, Northern Jim 
Crow, and coverture. It was critical to white male dominance to 
prevent the political discourses of liberty and democracy from 
merging with let;al discourses of property rights, slavery, contracts 
rights, etc. To argue that natural rights were not understood to be 
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or 
Immunities Clause because such rights were seen as connected to 
state, not federal, citizenship, is to replicate the very distinction 
that served to limit freedom and citizenship for excluded groups. xJ 
The process through which antebellum legal culture created 
meanings for citizenship that defined and circumscribed race and 
gender can be seen in the opinions in one of the cases so pivotal 
to the framing of the Amendment, Dred Scott. x4 Justice Taney's 
opinion in that case is part of the anti-canon in constitutional law, 
and Justice Curtis's dissent is often praised for its more accurate 
treatment of both history and democratic principles. But, on the 
question of citizenship, both opinions reflect an exclusionary idea 
of citizenship. 
X2. See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 
IN U.S. HISTORY 165-% (1997). 
X3. I should he clear that I think this is the effect of Lash's approach hut not his intent. 
Lash docs excellent work establishing that this distinction hetwccn state and federal 
privileges and immunities was likely intended hy John Bingham and that it was at least 
available to members of the ratifying puhlic. My argument here is that the more restrictive 
methodological and interpretive choices Lash makes have the effect of rc-implcmenting 
an antebellum view of citizenship and liberty that is ultimately inconsistent with an 
inclusive interpretive view and is incoherent compared to other values and meanings of 
the Reconstruction amendments, including those values that were advanced in puhlic 
discourse at the time. 
X4. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1X57). 
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Taney (following a position articulated by his predecessor as 
Attorney General, William Wirt) argued in favor of an egalitarian 
version of citizenship in which all who held the status were 
granted the same rights and privileges. For Taney, this was 
precisely why blacks could not be citizens, since they did not and 
could not possess the privileges of citizenship. K'i Curtis, on the 
other hand, would have recognized African-Americans as 
citizens. But citizenship for Curtis was not a zone of equality. It 
was tiered citizenship of separate status, differential privileges, 
and second-class membership; it was citizenship as understood in 
the Jim Crow North. Curtis accepted that citizenship privileges 
such as suffrage or even civil rights could be allocated based on 
race, even among citizens. ~6 Curtis supported this argument with 
an analogy to women's second-class citizenship: 
One [State] may confine the right of suffrage to white male 
citizens; another may extend it to colored persons and females; 
one may allow all persons above a prescribed age to convey 
property and transact business; another may exclude married 
women. But whether native-born women, or persons under 
age, or under guardianship because insane or spendthrifts, be 
excluded from voting or holding office, or allowed to do so, I 
apprehend no one will deny that they are citizens of the lJ nited 
States. 'II.? 
Women, and African-Americans by analogy, held a legally 
subordinated citizenship status on par with children and mentally 
ill white men. 
This tension between citizenship as a male, whites-only 
egalitarianism, and citizenship as a set of differentiated, 
subordinating layers, ran throughout antebellum law. When 
advocates of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment 
argued for a semi-egalitarian citizenship that included black men, 
in some ways they combined the two strands of Taney's and 
Curtis's opinions. Yet they, like Curtis, were caught betwixt and 
between, arguing for racial and gendered restrictions on suffrage 
as a means of securing and explaining the extension of other 
citizenship privileges to black men. 
Full citizenship itself required the subordination of others. 
This can be seen in how states to the West often defined 
themselves as lands of opportunity for free white men and at the 
X5. /d. at 423. 
X6. /d. at 5X3 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also id. at 5X7. 
X7. !d. at 5X3 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
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same time excluded blacks. This problem came to a head with the 
admission of Oregon, which barred free blacks from entering the 
territory.~~ In 1850 Congress had passed a homestead act that gave 
land in the Oregon Territory to white and "half-bred Indian" 
citizens who settled there, but barred blacks. xcJ The territory 
enacted racial exclusion laws banning free blacks from migrating 
there, and placed in its constitution in anticipation of statehood 
the migration exclusion, a ban on black ownership of property, a 
bar on black contract rights, and a denial of the right to sue. 90 The 
very creation of places of freedom and economic opportunity-
places where the privileges of citizenship could bring the most 
benefit-depended on the subordination of black citizens, even to 
the point of physical and legal exclusion. 
This symbiosis between privileged citizenship and legal and 
political subordination was most extensively evident in the law 
and practice of gender. As legal historian Laura Edwards has 
observed, "[M]en's legal status depended on the subordination of 
women. They held the civil and political rights necessary to fulfill 
their roles as heads of households, a position that also gave them 
rights over their wives and over all women to a lesser extent." 91 
The exclusion of women from citizenship rights, and the 
demarcation of their citizenship role as uncompensated 
household labor, enabled men to claim the very citizenship from 
which women were barred. 92 
The Civil War and Reconstruction exposed the tensions 
inherent in the political rhetoric of democratic, egalitarian 
citizenship and the legal language and structure that helped create 
and enforce subordinations. But it was largely through the voices 
of those excluded from official or legal speech and writing that 
this tension was exposed most clearly. The language of law did not 
itself provide a way to understand these contradictions; indeed, 
law generally seeks to stabilize contradictions by explaining 
exclusions, not by resolving them. Traditional approaches to 
originalism that attempt to define fixed meanings from 
HX. OR. CONST. of 1R57, art. I,§ :15. See RUTIIERGLEN, supra note 3l), at 23. 
Hl). Oregon Donation Land Act, l) Stat. 4% (1 H50). 
l)O. Elizabeth McLagan, The Black Laws of Oregon, 1844-1857, BLACKPAST.ORG, 
http://www.blackpast.org/perspectives/black-laws-oregon-1 H44-1 H57 (last visited Apr. 23, 
2015). Many Republicans, including John Bingham, opposed admission of Oregon because 
of these provisions. 
l)1. LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION: A NATION OF RIGHTS 13H (2015). 
l)2. !d.; see generally LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF TilE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT 
AND IDEOLOGY IN RI~VOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1l)H0). 
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contemporaneous legal and formal political culture and texts 
simply have no means of accessing alternative hermeneutics. 
This exclusionary problem runs throughout The Fourteenth 
Amendment. Chapter Two frames the question of citizenship and 
its privileges within antebellum legal battles. That focus then 
restricts how Lash evaluates the framing debates, ratification, and 
post-ratification implementations. Congressional investigations 
of the situation of blacks in the South play little role in the 
analysis, which hones in on the debates over the "legal term-of-
art" identified earlier. Ratification debates collapse into debates 
in which the words of the text (rather than its principles) are 
discussed, which, it turns out, were during the 1866 election rather 
than the subsequent southern ratification. Thus we are left, at the 
end of the day, with an interpretive landscape devoid of some of 
the key tensions and potential reinterpretations that were at issue 
even at the time of the Amendments. 
B. FREDERICK DOUGLASS & VICTORIA WOODHULL 
The two episodes where The Fourteenth Amendment 
addresses the views of blacks and women each reveal this 
problem. In his brief discussion of the full ratification period, Lash 
quotes an important essay by Frederick Douglass from the 
Atlantic Monthly in January 1867 (p. 216). Lash uses the essay to 
highlight Douglass's discussion of speech, press, and religion, 
which supports Lash's general point about the Bill of Rights as 
privileges of citizenship. But the speech- titled An Appeal to 
Congress for Impartial Suffrage- was primarily a forceful case for 
the centrality of suffrage and political rights as the essential means 
of fighting the slave power and eliminating caste.93 By pulling the 
Bill of Rights paragraph out of context, Lash misses the heart of 
Douglass's point that the vote was the most important right of 
citizenship. Significantly, Douglass published this just after the 
Republican victory of 1866, during ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and prior to the Reconstruction Acts. It was a point 
that he and other African-American leaders had been making 
consistently and urgently for over two years. And it was the 
direction that the newly elected Republicans would eventually 
take, in no small part because of the constant demands of black 
Republicans. 
93. Frederick Douglass, An Appeal to Congress for Impartial Suffrage, THE 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Jan. 1, 1H67), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archivc/1 X67 /01 /an-appea 1-to-congress-for-impartial-suffragc/306547 I. 
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Consider what Douglass writes in the paragraph immediately 
following the one Lash quotes about First Amendrnent freedoms: 
This evil principle [slavery and master-class ideologyJ again 
seeks admission into our body politic. It comes now in shape of 
a denial of political rights to four million loyal colored people. 
The South does not now ask for slavery. It only asks for a large 
degraded caste, which shall have no political rights. This ends 
the case. Statesmen, beware what you do. The destiny of 
unborn and unnumbered generations is in your hands. Will you 
repeat the mistake of your fathers, who sinned ignorantly? or 
will you profit by the blood-bought wisdom all round you, and 
forever expel every vestige of the old abomination from our 
national borders? As you members of the Thirty-ninth 
Congress decide, will the country be peaceful, united, and 
happy, or troubled, divided, and miserable. 94 
Throughout the essay, Douglass argues for suffrage as an 
essential privilege of republican government, the denial of which 
produces a caste society that is the antithesis of democracy and 
the vestige of slavery. His invocation of rights of speech and press 
and religion are meant to show how terrible slavery ideology can 
and must be, and to bring home the point that broad-based 
suffrage is the essential right to protect all other rights. 
It is notable also that this was the second of two post-election 
essays Douglass wrote for the The Atlantic Monthly. In December 
1866, he first took up the question of what Congress should do 
with its victory.'15 That essay reflects Douglass's understanding of 
the complexities of American society and government. He argued 
both for a more aggressive policy, especially in favor of suffrage, 
and that total centralization of powers is wrong and impractical. 
Indeed, the problems inherent in federalism themselves speak 
loudly in favor of full voting rights, according to Douglass, for 
universal suffrage is how state and local governance can be 
merged with protection of basic human rights and elimination of 
caste. But there is no question for Douglass that the purpose of 
all government was the protection of human rights. As he wrote 
in his concluding paragraph: 
Fortunately, the Constitution of the United States knows no 
distinction between citizens on account of color. Neither does it 
know any difference between a citizen of a State and a citizen of 
the United States. Citizenship evidently includes all the rights of 
94. /d. 
95. Frederick Douglass, Reconstruction, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Dec. 1X66), 
available at http://www. thea tlan tic.com/magazine/archive/1 X66/12/reconstruction/304561 I . 
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citizens, whether State or national. If the Constitution knows 
none, it is clearly no part of the duty of a Republican Congress 
now to institute one. The mistake of the last session was the 
attempt to do this very thing, by a renunciation of its power to 
secure political rights to any class of citizens, with the obvious 
purpose to allow the rebellious States to disfranchise, if they 
should sec fit, their colored citizens. This unfortunate blunder 
must now be retrieved, and the emasculated citizenship given 
to the negro supplanted by that contemplated in the 
Constitution of the United States, which declares that the 
citizens of each State shall enjoy all the rights and immunities 
of citizens of the several States,-so that a legal voter in any 
State shall be a legal voter in all the States. 96 
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Douglass rejected the idea of separate citizenships and 
privileges. For him such distinctions were contrary to the 
Constitution (here he espoused the radical version of the pre-
Amendment Constitution) and amounted to a perpetuation of 
caste-based slave society. He also argued that the election-which 
itself wrongly excluded four million loyal black citizens-showed 
that 
the people have emphatically pronounced in favor of a radical 
policy .... [T]hey have everywhere broken into demonstrations 
of the wildest enthusiasm when a brave word has been spoken 
in favor of equal rights and impartial suffrage. Radicalism, so 
far from being odious, is now the popular passport to power. 97 
This is a very different view of the election and the structure 
and relationship of rights than presented in The Fourteenth 
Amendment. Rather than being a confirmation of a moderate 
position, Douglass argued the election embraced the radicals. 
Rather than supporting the fine distinctions among levels and 
types of citizenship based in antebellum legal terms-of-art, 
Douglass saw a unified citizenship where rights of state and 
United States citizenship combined as basic human rights. Where 
suffrage was deferred and carved out of constitutional citizenship, 
Douglass saw it as the pinnacle of basic rights and essential to 
republican government. 
Much of what Douglass wrote was consistent with positions 
of many white radical Republicans with whom he worked. But it 
would be limiting to see only those connections, for these were 
positions argued by African-Americans writing and meeting in 
96. !d. (emphasis added). 
97. /d. 
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conventions for many years, and particularly fron1 1864 through 
1867. African-Americans pressed these views into the public 
debate and engaged their white friends and advocates to support 
the positions. Frederick Douglass's writings were but the tip of an 
iceberg of African-American views on citizenship, freedom, and 
1. 9~ equa tty. 
The other moment in The Fourteenth Amendment where 
excluded perspectives make an appearance is where Lash 
discusses congressional debates over Victoria Woodhull's petition 
for Congress to pass legislation mandating women's suffrage (pp. 
234-242). Lash quotes briefly from the petition, highlighting its 
references to the Fifteenth Amendment and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth. At that point, however, 
Lash switches to a discussion of the arguments of Albert Riddle, 
Woodhull's attorney, and the debates among members of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, which received the petition. 
Riddle cited Corfield to support suffrage as being a privilege of 
citizenship, and the committee responded with a conservative 
reading of the Clause that aligned it with the Comity Clause (pp. 
235-238). 99 Lash sees the report as limited mainly to 
acknowledging the widely accepted point that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause did not protect suffrage and otherwise as not 
a helpful episode in considering the Amendment's public 
meantng. 
Unfortunately, Lash's focus on the legal debates stretching 
backwards to the antebellum period appears to cause him to miss 
other aspects of the public discourse. Woodhull's own petition is 
largely passed over in favor of the legalistic arguments of her 
counsel. HK) Such legal argument necessarily tracked prior 
arguments about the privileges of citizenship, but it also narrowed 
9X. For example, sec Proceedings of the National Convention of Colored Men 
(Syracuse, NY), Oct. IXM; Proceedings of the Colored People's Convention of the State of 
South Carolina (Charleston, SC) Nov. 1X65, reprinted in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK 
STATE CONVENTIONS, 1X40-1X6S, 2XX-302 (PhilipS. Foncr & George E. Walker cds., 
19X0); JOHN MERCER LANGSTON, FREEDOM AND CITIZENSHIP (1 XX3) (reprinting his 
earlier essays). See also EGERTON, supra note 51, at 1 X2 ("African American journalists 
pioneered many of the arguments later employed by Washington politicians and even by 
the most progressive white Republicans, who had to answer to the more moderate white 
voters in their home districts."). 
99. See also HOUSE REPORT ON MEMORIAL OF VICTORIA C. WOODHULL, CONG. 
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Scss., H.R. REP. No. 22 (1X71). 
100. A.G. Riddle was a former congressman, a prominent Washington lawyer, and an 
advocate of women's suffrage. He worked closely with suffrage proponents such as 
Woodhull. See JILL NORGREN, BELVA LOCKWOOD: THE WOMAI\ WHO WOULD BE 
PRESIDENT .SX-59 (2007). 
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the frame to exclude Woodhull's broader claims. 101 There is much 
more going on here than traditional originalist approaches usually 
acknowledge. First, there is the distinct possibility that the stated 
arguments and views of male Republicans shifted depending on 
the subject. Republicans such as Bingham were expansive on 
issues of suffrage and citizenship and federal powers when 
addressing the claims of white males and eventually those of black 
men. But when the topic shifted to women's rights, so too did the 
rhetoric and interpretive posture. 
Victoria Woodhull challenged Bingham on precisely this 
point. In a (at the time) 102 well-known public speech she gave after 
the Committee rejected her petition and which she also published, 
Woodhull took Bingham to task for his hypocrisy in supporting 
an aggressive use of congressional power over suffrage with the 
Enforcement Act of 1870, which he authored, and his dismissal of 
her petition. As she said, "It is almost impossible to conceive that 
the author of this report was the same person who drew the XIV. 
Amendment, and AN ACT to enforce the rights of citizens of the 
United States to vote in the several States of the Union, and for 
other purposes, approved May 31, 1870." 103 Then, after quoting 
the Enforcement Act, she continued: 
Thus we find Mr. Bingham, in the XIV. Amendment, declaring 
that all persons are citizens; in an Act approved May 31, 1870, 
making it a penal offense for any officer of election in any State 
to refuse to permit all citizens the same and equal opportunities 
to perform the prerequisites to become qualified to vote; less 
than a year afterward informing us that women are not citizens, 
and on January 30, 1871-less than two months thereafter-
very decidedly expressing a contrary opinion, and adding that 
Congress had no power to enforce their rights as citizens in the 
101. Lash also downplays the minority's report, which was ahout three times as long 
as Bingham's and engaged in a full defense of voting as a necessary privilege of citizenship. 
It cited extensively from antehellum sources-domestic and comparative- to show that 
voting had long heen seen as the essential and defining right of citizenship. VIEWS OF THE 
MINORITY ON MEMORIAL OF VICTORIA C. WOODHULL, CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d 
Sess., H.R. REP. No. 22, pt. 2, at 2-12 (1X71). 
102. Woodhull rose to prominence as a women's rights advocate in 1X70 when she 
announced her candidacy for president in IX72. She was a well-regarded speaker, and her 
speeches after the petition to Congress were given at the height of her popularity. See 
generally LOIS BEACHY UNDERHILL, THE WOMAN WHO RAN FOR PRESIDENT: THE 
MANY LIVES OF VICTORIA WOODHULL (llJ95). 
103. Victoria C. Woodhull, A Lecture on Constitutional Equality, Delivered at 
Lincoln Hall, Washington, D.C. (Feh. 1h, 1X71), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
hin/query/h?ammem/nawhih:(c!)(·icld(NUMBER+(alhand(rhnawsa+n 15o9)). 
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States, which is a complete stultification of the Act of last 
M 1()4 ay. 
Moreover, Woodhull's constitutional argument was based 
not on a backward-looking common law analysis but on a 
progressive natural-rights constitutionalism. As she said 
Those who look upon woman's status by the dim light of the 
common law, which unfolded itself under the feudal and 
military institutions that establish right upon physical power, 
cannot find any analogy in the status of the woman citizen of 
this country, where the broad sunshine of our Constitution has 
enfranchised all. 105 
Her argument was essentially that women, as people and citizens, 
always held an inalienable right to sovereignty and therefore 
suffrage, and that the denial of suffrage had been a long error and 
a bald assertion of illegitimate power by men ("it is by usurpation 
only that men debar [women] from their right to vote" 10('). The 
language of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth J\mendments-
especially when read together-recognized women as citizens and 
recognized the right of citizens to vote as a basic requirement of 
citizenship. 
She further argued that the basic fundamental rights 
protected by the Constitution support political rights as well: 
"Women have the same inalienable right to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness that men have. Why have they not this right 
politically, as well as men?" 107 She listed the citizenship 
contributions of women- property ownership, tax payment, 
raising children (including men), and commerce-and challenged 
the Committee to explain how these recognitions of citizenship 
supported a denial of the basic right to vote. lllx Indeed, her 
argument tracked, in many ways, the political rhetoric of 
Republicans when they argued for civil and political rights for 
black men, especially in the way she tied together grand principles 
104. !d. at 26. When Woodhull had first approached Bingham as Committee Chair 
ahout her petition, he replied that she was not a citizen. On that particular point she 
convinced him otherwise hy quoting Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sec 
UNDERHILL, supra note 102, at 9Y. This seems to me to support the argument that when 
the topic of women's rights came up, men had trouhlc thinking straight ahout even their 
own handiwork. 
105. Victoria C. Woodhull, Address on Constitutional Equality to the Judiciary 
Committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives (Jan. 2, 1 H71 ). 
106. /d. 
107. !d. 
IOK !d. 
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to general constitutional language and contrasted that with the 
practical failure to implement the ideals. 
Bingham's response for the Committee, when contrasted 
with Woodhull's Memorial, is strikingly devoid of the high-flying 
Republican rhetoric that he and others used when speaking of 
male rights. It reads much more like a retreat into the dark 
recesses of restrictive and cramped legalese, defining the 
Amendments and congressional power narrowly. Bingham's 
report even becomes internally contradictory, citing the long, 
natural rights and pro-suffrage passage from Corjzeld only to 
argue that the passage supports the committee's narrow, anti-
suffrage, equality-only reading. 10l) The minority jumped on this 
point, calling this "an exceedingly unfortunate citation" for the 
majority since the ~uote actually supported seeing suffrage as a 
fundamental right. 11 
Woodhull presented a more developed, and publicly 
oriented, version of her arguments in her speech in February, 
arguments differing significantly from the Committee's view 
(although she incorBorated some positions set out by the 
Committee minoriti 1). For example, she argued that suffrage 
flowed directly as a natural right from the right to both liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness, since people are not free who cannot 
participate in governance and the?' were also prevented from 
pursuing their own happiness. 11 She also argued for a 
constitutionalism of principles, not applications. Just as the fact of 
slavery did not undermine the principles of equality and freedom 
set forth by the founding fathers, so too the history of gender 
prejudice did not negate the true principles of equal political 
powers. 113 Where the committee had argued that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had changed nothing regarding the privileges of 
109. HOUSE REPORT ON MEMORIAL OF VICTORIA C. WOODHULL supra note 99, at 
2. It is odd that Bingham cited Corfield, given his aversion to using it in 1 X66, and given the 
obvious ammunition it gave the minority. 
110. VIEWS OF TilE MINORITY ON MEMORIAL OF VICTORIA C. WOODIHJLL, supra 
note 101, at 7. 
111. This is not surprising. Woodhull had sought out and befriended Representative 
Benjamin Butler after declaring as a presidential candidate, since he was a known advocate 
for women's suffrage, and he had been instrumental in arranging her appearance. They 
probably collaborated on the strategies and arguments surrounding the memorial. 
UNDERHILL, supra note 102, at 97-103. 
112. A Lecture on Constitutional Equality, supra note 103, at 4--5 (pursuit of 
happiness) and 9-10 (liberty). 
11.3. /d. at 10. Although Woodhull's work is not used by them, its themes-and 
especially its emphasis on principle over application- fits well with Calabresi and Rickert's 
analysis of anti-caste principles and the Fourteenth Amendment's relation to sex 
discrimination. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note XI. 
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citizenship, Woodhull argued that the Amendments had 
corrected the long failure of reality to match principle. 114 
Woodhull's arguments drew important parallels with the 
claims made by African-American men about suffrage as an 
inherent citizenship privilege, especially on the point of suffrage 
and political rights being the most important rights which secure 
all others. But she also tapped into the political theory and 
rhetoric of the women's movement. Ideas about citizenship 
privileges and gender had been part of feminist thinking since at 
least the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments in 1848, and by 
1869 women such as Virginia Minor (whose assertion of the right 
to vote the Supreme Court would reject in 1875 115) were arguing 
for women's suffrage as a right of citizenship under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 116 Thus, like Douglass, \Voodhull wrote 
within a context of an engaged community seeking access to full 
citizenship. Her rhetoric invoked common themes and ideas, ones 
which her audiences- her alternative "public"-would have 
known well, even if many in the dominant public, like John 
Bingham, retreated at the thought. 
C. RETHINKING PUBLIC MEANING 
Unfortunately, traditional originalism misses these texts and 
arguments. Lash's treatment of Douglass and Woodhull is fleeting 
and largely instrumental- Douglass for the purpose of supporting 
the Bill of Rights as privileges of citizenship, Woodhull for 
analyzing what John Bingham and his Committee said about the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Even though Douglass and 
Woodhull themselves wrote and spoke extensively on issues of 
citizenship, rights, liberty, equality, citizenship privileges, and the 
Constitution, and even though both reflected and engaged with 
larger "publics," neither plays much of a role in Lash's effort to 
unearth the public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
114. Her lecture also included a common argument of post-war suffragists that women 
were more entitled to suffrage than blacks, so black suffrage necessitated women's 
suffrage. A Lecture on Constitutional Equality, supra note 103, at 12. On the problem of 
racism and this period in feminism, sec generally FAYE E. DUDDEN, FIGHTING CHANCE: 
THE STRUGGLE OVER WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND BLACK SUFFRAGE IN RECONSTRUCTION 
AMERICA (2011); PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF 
BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 64--74 (19H4). 
115. Minor v. Happersett, HH U.S. 162 (1H75). 
116. The Declaration declared suffrage the most important inalienable right. It also 
demanded access to a full range the rights and privileges of citizenship, including 
occupation, religion, and education. Declaration of Sentiments, Seneca Falls Convention 
(1 H4H). On Minor, Woodhull, Belva Lockwood, and other women's suffrage activists, sec 
NORGREN, supra note 100 at 53-66 (2007). 
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This failure to capture excluded perspectives presents two 
major obstacles for traditional originalism. First, originalism has 
been subject to the critique-first leveled by Paul Brest in 1980-
that it privileges the views of a minority of the public comprised 
of white males who held political power at the time of the framing, 
even though our current Constitution, and our current 
understanding of democratic legitimacy, reject such political 
subordinations. 117 While this critique is usually made against 
founding-era originalism, for originalism to also do this with the 
Reconstruction Amendments, which themselves expanded 
citizenship and for which there are extant records of the views and 
ideas of African-Americans and women, only makes the 
exclusionary critique even more trenchant. 
Second, this problem reveals a conceptual misperception of 
the very thing that originalists advance as a legitimating principle: 
public meaning. Lash grounds his approach on public meaning. 
Yet the "public" from which he constructs historical meaning is 
consistently exclusionary. In relying on antebellum legal 
meanings for the ideas of citizenship privileges Lash adopts 
meanings created by lawyers, judges, members of congress, 
treatise authors, and treaty drafters. Women, blacks, and other 
racial minorities were almost entirely excluded from these groups. 
Moreover, the very concepts at issue-citizenship and its 
privileges- were among the key legal tools with which law and 
the legal system perpetuated the exclusion and subordination of 
women and blacks. African-Americans, and to a lesser degree 
women, did gain some influence, at least politically, during the 
War and Reconstruction, both by voicing their own views and 
through the political actions and speeches of their white 
Republican friends. Yet Lash defines the "public" of 
Reconstruction as the moderate Republicans, highlighting a 
consensus view among white men, including conservatives, and 
marginalizing competing views of the more radical white men who 
worked with blacks and women in developing political and legal 
arguments. Lash's operational "public"- the group from whom 
he derives interpretive force- is in fact a subgroup of the actual 
public. 
The justification for this is that the people who ratified the 
amendments are the ones who constitute the public. But even 
there Lash runs into problems, since he largely ignores the 
117. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original UnderstandinK, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 229 (19!·m); Stein, supra note XI. See also Greene, supra note XO. 
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Southern ratification and post-ratification Reconstruction, in 
which African-Americans had a significant role. It also ignores the 
possible arguments and ideas being generated among feminists, 
who still had no political role in ratification. 
The fragmentation of the nineteenth-century public-often, 
but not exclusively through legally enforced restrictions-renders 
any attempt to find a public meaning inherently flawed. Too often 
originalists assume a single public from which mleaning can be 
determined. But in fact the assumption of a historically singular 
public is itself an exclusionary practice, one that defines away 
dissenting voices and marginalizes the alternative "publics" that 
were formally excluded from public forums such as Congress, 
courts, and the press. Public meaning originalists operate under a 
dual myth that first assumes that they can identify a consensus of 
meaning among dominant speakers and writers, and second that 
this purported consensus reflects the meanings adopted by those 
who were systematically excluded from public forums. Without a 
deliberate effort to recapture lost voices, however, the "public" in 
public meaning originalism remains both exclusionary and 
historically erroneous. 
To some degree this error stems from another commitment 
of traditional originalism, that of fixed meaning. Lawrence Solum 
has described the "Fixation Thesis" as a core unifying principle of 
originalism. 11 x Even within originalist methods this fixation idea 
runs into difficulty, since important constitutional terms, not to 
mention their cultural meanings, are ambiguous, vague, and 
contested. This problem is even more acute during times of 
change and transition (which are often precisely the times when 
constitutional creation takes place). This is why we see Lash 
struggling in The Fourteenth Amendment to manage the disputes 
among Republicans with a resulting Procrustean Bed that cuts off 
strong evidence of a fundamental rights view and leaves a more 
conservative enumerated rights perspective on the table as the 
singular meaning. 119 
11 K. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & 
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITlJTIONAL 0RIGINALISM: A DEBATE I, 4 (2011 ). 
119. Lash attempts to avoid this charge by suggesting that his study only defines a floor 
and a ceiling (pp. 279-2KO). Lawrence Solum has recently cited Lash's analysis as 
illustrative of his own view of fixation as representing a range of meanings. Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of 1/istorical Fact in Original Meaning 75-76 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Georgetown University Law Center), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2559701. Y ct Lash's range or meaning 
is quite narrow. Even within traditional originalism he excludes both of the other main 
originalist readings, the equal rights and the fundamental rights theori,es (pp. 2K0-2K7). 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 607 
The fixation problem also shows itself in Lash's tendency to 
treat the language of the Amendment as isolated phrasings 
reflecting distinct concepts. He concludes that privileges of 
citizens of the United States must be different from those of state 
citizens, while each must differ from due process, and in turn all 
differ from equal protection. Although this is certainly one valid 
interpretive approach, it is not the only one, and it is not the one 
most plausible within a public meaning framework. It is unlikely 
that the ratifying public, let alone those excluded from 
ratification, understood this type of textual precision and 
separation. The search for fixed meanings prevents Lash from 
exploring the ways in which the Amendments spoke through 
duplication, overlapping and intertwining the meanings of 
phrases and clauses. It may well be that the language of the 
Reconstruction Amendments interconnects in ways that resist 
legal precision and the type of fixed clarity Lash searches for 
(which may explain why the texts have been so maddening for 
. d d 1 . ) 120 JU ges an awyers ever since . 
The fixation problem becomes even clearer when one 
considers that there was a much wider range of "publics" speaking 
about and experiencing the problems of liberty and citizenship. 
By circumscribing the very concept of public in a way that adopts 
historical exclusions, Lash has created a false public and a false 
range. The weight he gives to the fundamental rights approach, 
for instance, would be quite different were he to take more 
account of African-American and feminist views of citizenship 
and its basic privileges. 121 Neither blacks nor feminists accepted 
the fine distinctions regarding rights and privileges, and both 
groups read terms like "citizenship," "privileges," and "equality" 
capaciously and as mutually supporting. As people who were 
excluded from power-political, economic, and social-they 
perceived most clearly what was actually considered fundamental 
in practice. They also understood the importance of those rights 
and privileges as an interlocking bundle, secured by suffrage. 
120. See Richard Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or 
Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CON. L. 12Y.'i, B06-07 (200Y); Boyce, supra note 14. 
121. In a forthcoming work, I suggest that the perspectives of African-Americans and 
feminists deserve even greater weight than other groups (and certainly greater weight than 
the defeated slave power), precisely hecause hlack men and then all women were 
subsequently incorporated into the constitutionally recognized puhlic. That is, originalist 
perspectives on the historical puhlic should, to function as valid interpretations of our 
constitution, do more work in recovering and giving meaning to the historically excluded 
perspectives. One need not, however, agree with this particular extension of my analysis 
to accept the criticism of originalism's concept of the puhlic. 
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Anything short of that meant continued subordination, whether 
in education or local government or business or family or any 
number of arenas. 122 
The question is whether there is any possibility of a public 
meaning original ism given the fact of a fractured historical public. 
Developing a theory of public meaning originalisn1 is beyond the 
scope of this review, but a few thoughts are perhaps in order. 123 
First, rather than seeking a fixed and singular view of usage and 
meaning it will be important to give more weight to competing or 
overlapping meanings. Lawrence Solum's idea of a range of 
meanings remains relevant here. 124 There will no doubt be 
different views about how tightly to draw the accepted range, with 
candidates including everything from a more restrictive effort to 
identify the broadest possible consensus set of usages to a far 
more open idea of a range of available meanings. However, if 
resolution of the exclusionary problem is taken seriously, there 
must be some significant inclusion of excluded voices in 
whichever version one adopts. 
Second, there should be some effort to recognize how 
excluded groups, when arguing and acting for inclusion, often 
reformulate received meanings in ways that dramatically 
reconfigure the terms at issue. As we have seen, ideas of 
citizenship and civil rights were shifting and being redefined 
throughout this period. Reformist publics often take the language 
of dominant publics, extracting reformist principles to reconfigure 
and reapply those terms as consistent with reformist ideas and 
goals. Not only is such reconfiguration part of the overall public 
discourse, it is often essential. This is why one cannot, as does 
Lash, privilege traditional usages of terms such as "civil rights" 
without at the very least also accounting for a range of 
reconfigured meanings; and quite possibly one may need to 
privilege the reformulated meaning ahead of the traditional 
meanings, especially where the traditional meanings themselves 
served to perpetuate the very problem (e.g., racial and gendered 
exclusions) that the constitutional changes appear to address. 
Third, recognition of the role of excluded publics may also 
require a more forward-looking approach to meaning formation. 
122. For feminists, part of the criti4uc involved the 4ucstioning of the emerging legal 
construction of the "puhlic-privatc" distinction. Just as John Bingham assumed Victoria 
Woodhull was not a citizen, so did most men-and the law they wrote-assume that most 
women were not properly part of the "puhlic." Feminism has long challenged that trope. 
123. For more development of this idea, sec Fox, supra note HO. 
124. See Solum, supra note lltJ. 
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As discussed above, the question of suffrage as a privilege of 
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment can be seen, as 
Lash sees it, as plainly decided (in the negative) by the expressions 
of drafters and at least some of the Amendment's advocates in the 
1866 election campaign. But this excludes the views of many 
African-Americans, including Frederick Douglass, who saw 
suffrage as an essential aspect of citizenship and who, along with 
white radical Republicans, implemented universal male suffrage 
on the ground in the South in 1867 and 1868. The extent to which 
the reformist meanings or the conventional meanings are 
employed becomes part of the choice we make today, whether 
under originalism or under other forms of historically based 
interpretive inquiry. Due regard for the views of excluded groups 
would suggest, at the very least, that one need not adopt the 
meaning expressed by those legislators most anxious about their 
election prospects as they competed in a white male suffrage 
environment where they needed to cater to white racism. 
These and many other things may follow from recognition of 
multiple publics and the legitimacy problem inherent in historical 
excisions. The point here, however, is more to identify the 
problem and see how it hinders an otherwise impressive work on 
the constitutional history of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
With The Fourteenth Amendment, Kurt Lash gives us 
perhaps the most thorough investigation of the background for 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. It is well worth the praise it 
has received. But in the quality of its execution it also reveals the 
deeper flaws of originalism, and in particular of the developing 
field of public meaning originalism. 
The Reconstruction Amendments- having been ignored or 
poorly engaged by originalism prior to Lash and other recent 
scholars-is precisely the point at which originalism has the 
potential to move beyond the exclusionary approach that many 
consider a fatal flaw. As Lash's research shows, originalism, 
because it takes historical materials seriously, can advance our 
own thinking about the possible meaning( s) of constitutional text 
and can expand our historical knowledge of the period 
surrounding the ratification of its provisions. 
In particular, the move to a focus on public meaning is a 
promising one, since, unlike the framers or ratifiers, the concept 
of "public" opens the door to a robust and more democratic 
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approach to constitutional history and interpretation. Where The 
Fourteenth Amendment falls short is in its failure to expand its 
historical lens to recognize the scope of the "public" and to see 
that there were in fact multiple, overlapping publics from which 
constitutional meanings can be gleaned. Doing so will require a 
version of originalism far more receptive to c01npeting ideas, 
ambiguous and contradictory meanings, and an open (and often 
squirrelly) world of public and political rhetoric. But it will also 
help bring the long-excluded ideas and perspectives of our 
democracy into the field of debate over the mleaning of the 
Constitution. 
